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On February 14, 1994, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit ("the Federal Circuit") decided In re Donaldson Co., Inc.,I in
which the court laid out how the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("the patent office") must construe "means-plus-function"
claims both during original prosecution and during reexamination.
This article discusses the law of means-plus-function claims in light of
several recent pronouncements of the Federal Circuit, the Donaldson
decision, and a recent decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences ("Board" or "BPAJ"), ex parte Alappat,2 currently
pending before the Federal Circuit for en banc review.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Overruling The Supreme Court's Decision In Halliburton
In Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker,3 the United
States Supreme Court invalidated a patent claim for failing to particu-
larly point out and distinctly claim the invention in violation of the
predecessor statute to 35 U.S.C. § 112.4 The only improvement over
the prior art was the addition of a certain mechanical acoustic resona-
tor for tuning a receiver to a certain frequency.5 The claim in question
recited the elements of a prior art apparatus plus the improvement re-
cited as a "means ... for tuning said receiving means."6 The Supreme
Court ruled that it was impermissible to describe "[the] most crucial
element in the 'new' combination in terms of what it will do rather
than in terms of its own physical characteristics or its arrangement in
the new combination apparatus."7 A claim could not properly cover
any device that performed the claimed function "now known or here-
after invented, whether the device be an actual equivalent of the [pat-
1. 16 F.3d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
2. 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1340 (B.P.A.I. 1992).
3. 329 U.S. 1 (1946).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 33 (1946) current version at 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1992).
5. Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 7.
6. Id at 8.
7. Id. at 9. "In Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker [329 U.S. 1 (1946)], the
Supreme Court held that means-plus-function language could not be employed at the exact point
of novelty in a combination claim." In re Donaldson, 16 F.3d 1189, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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entee's] ingredient or not, ..8."' In the 1952 Patent Act,9 Congress
overruled Halliburton, by enacting a statutory section, now codified at
35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6 [hereinafter "section 112(6)"],10 which
provides:
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the reci-
tal of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claims
shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or
acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof."
Thus, while this new statute sanctioned use of so-called "means
for" or "means-plus-function" language found impermissible in Halli-
burton, it also addressed the Supreme Court's concern by limiting the
literal scope of such language to that which distinctly claims the in-
vention, that is, to "the corresponding structure, material, or acts de-
scribed in the specification and equivalents thereof.' 2 Nevertheless,
patent practitioners have historically employed "means for" limita-
tions in claims with the intent and expectation that in litigation they
will be able to argue that the limitation reads on (i.e., literally covers)
any means for performing the claimed function, known and unknown
at the time the application for patent was filed, so long as such an
interpretation would not render the claim invalid. Thus, in effect, the
"means for" limitation was a moving target for the accused infringer.
With each prior art reference the accused uncovered, the patentee
would merely argue for a slightly narrower construction of the "means
for" language that distinguished over the prior art yet still could be
said to cover the accused device.' 3
8. Halliburton, 329 U.S. at 12.
9. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 112, 66 Stat. 792, 798-99 (1952).
10. "Congress enacted paragraph six, originally paragraph three [in the 1952 Act], to statu-
torily overrule that holding [in Halliburton]." Donaldson 16 F.3d at 1194.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
12. This article does not address the issue of whether § 112(6) has application to method
claims reciting limitations in "step for performing a function." The statute indicates that such
might be the case, referring to a combination of "step[s]" that may be understood as relating to
steps in a process claim. Indeed, in a 1954 commentary written by P.J. Federico, a principal
drafter of the 1952 Act, he explicitly states that the last paragraph of "section 112 relating to so-
called functional claims" extends to "a combination of ... steps in a process claim .. " PJ.
Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1954 ed. West), reprinted in 75
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 161, 186 (1993)(emphasis added). However, no case known
to the author has ever unambiguously applied section 112(6) to method claims.
13. At the oral argument on the appeal in In re Alappat, see infra note 63 and text follow-
ing, Judge Plager enquired whether the patent office could require the applicant to state what he
intends to cover by his means plus function language. Solicitor McKelvey responded: "There's
plenty of patent attorneys in the room. If you ask them if their claims are narrow and there's not
a one of them is going to admit any claim is narrow until you show them a piece of art that
arguably gets close and then they'll argue with you about it." -See Edward J. Webman, The
19941
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B. Section 112(6) Determinations in Litigation
In litigation, the following rules of claim construction have
emerged. A claim must be interpreted the same way for determining
validity and infringement.1g "Means-plus-function" claim language
must be construed in accordance with section 112(6).15 Thus, in liti-
gation, a means-plus-function limitation is construed under section
112(6) as literally covering only the structure disclosed in the specifi-
cation and equivalents thereof that perform identically the function
recited. A claim thus cannot be literally infringed unless the accused
device includes a structure for performing the claimed function that is
the same as or equivalent to the structure disclosed in the patent speci-
fication for performing the claimed function.1 6 Similarly, in litigation
a claim cannot be found to be anticipated by the prior art under 35
U.S.C. § 102 unless that prior art discloses a structure for performing
the claimed function that is the same as or equivalent to the structure
disclosed in the patent specification for performing the claimed func-
tion. Furthermore, the prior art cannot render a claim obvious under
35 U.S.C. § 103 unless the structure disclosed in the patent specifica-
tion for performing the claimed function, or an equivalent of that
structure, would have been obvious in view of the prior art.
One tactic formulated by patent practitioners for evading the nar-
row claim construction required by section 112(6), was to include a
"means for" limitation in a "broad" independent claim, then add limit-
ing structure in claims depending therefrom. In litigation, the patentee
would then argue that the doctrine of claim differentiation precluded
the court from construing the "means for" language in the independent
claim as including the structural details recited in the narrower, depen-
dent claim. 7 The Federal Circuit, however, has recently rebuffed
those tactics by ruling that the doctrine of claim differentiation is sub-
Controversy Over Application of 35 U.S.C. § 112 16 to Patentability Determinations, 76 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OF. Soc'y 47, 60 (Jan. 1994), reproducing portions of the oral argument in
Alapatt and Donaldson. Tapes of oral argument in Alappat and Donaldson are available from
the Clerk, U.S.'Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 717, N.W., Washington D.C. 20439. Id.
at 55, nn. 53-54.
14. W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Senmed Inc. v. Richard-Allen Medical Industries, 888 F.2d 815, 818 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
15. Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1060 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); Johnston v. Ivac Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
16. Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1388-89 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
17. Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, when a patent claim does not contain a
certain limitation and another claim (independent or dependent or both) does, that limitation
cannot be read into the former claim in determining validity or infringement. SRI Intern. v.
Matsushita Elec. Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (an independent claim
1 cannot be read to include the limitation of claim 2 which depended therefrom or the limitation
of another independent claim 3).
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servient to the claim construction mandated by section 112(6).1 s The
same should be the result where the practitioner replaces the word
"means" with a similar term like "device." 19
Some patent holders in litigation have presented arguments that
"means for" language should be allowed a broad range of structural
equivalents. However, these arguments are being met with ever-in-
creasing disfavor. Although the Federal Circuit has never adequately
defined a test or standard for determining equivalents under section
112(6), the court has indicated that the scope of section 112(6)
equivalents may require, at a minimum, that the accused structure op-
erate in substantially the same way as the structure described in the
patent specification.2" Furthermore, while it is true that the Federal
Circuit has noted on a number of occasions that the test for section
112(6) equivalents is not the same as the test for equivalents under the
18. See The Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord Inc., 939 F.2d 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991), in which the
Federal Circuit held that it was proper under section 112(6) to construe the "means for joining"
limitation in claim 21 to include a "cross member" as recited in claim 24 depending therefrom:
mhe interpretation of the 'means for joining' to include a cross member
comes from the specification via section 112(6), not from claim 24. Thus, the
prohibition against reading limitations from a dependent claim into the independ-
ent claim is not violated. Laitram's argument that claim 24 prevents claim 21
from being interpreted as statutorily mandated by section 112(6) must be
rejected....
Simply stated, the judicially developed guide to claim interpretation known
as "claim differentiation" cannot override the statute. A means-plus-function lim-
itation is not made open-ended by the presence of another claim specifically
claiming the disclosed structure which underlies the means clause or an
equivalent of that structure. If Laitram's argument were adopted, it would pro-
vide a convenient way of avoiding the express mandate of section 112(6). We
hold that one cannot escape that mandate by merely adding a claim or claims
specifically reciting such structure or structures.
Id. at 1538.
19. In Application of Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A. 1979), claim 54, directed to an
apparatus for the exploration of mineral deposits in the earth conducted from an airplane while in
flight, recited "a maneuverable airplane adapted to transport an operating screw and. . .a mag-
netic detecting instrument carried by the airplane and adapted while in the air automatically to
receive and respond to with a sensitivity of one gamma or less." I. at 544. For purposes of
decision, the court construed the airplane and a maguetic detecting instrument plus the adapted
clause to be the equivalent of a means plus function clause: Ud. at 546. See also Sam Silverberg,
The Patent & Trademark Office Clashes with the Federal Circuit Over Means Plus Function, 74
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 675, 680 n.17 (1992).
20. See Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing Co., 983 F.2d 1039, 1042-44
(Fed. Cir. 1993) ("control means" limitation not met by an accused structure which operated in a
different way than structure disclosed in the patent). But see Baltimore Therapeutic Equipment
v. Loredan Biomedical, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1672, 1677-78 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Rich, J., concur-
ring) (providing an interesting analysis of section 112(6) equivalents, arguing that ar"equivalent
structure" is not the same as a "structural equivalent," and that only the former is required under
section 112(6)).
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doctrine of equivalents,21 it may very well be the case that recent Fed-
eral Circuit decisions severely limiting the doctrine of equivalents will
be carried over to equivalents under section 112(6).22 Thus, the mov-
ing "means" target employed by patentees should be slowed if not
stopped altogether.
C. Section 112(6) Determinations in the Patent Office
Relative to the Prior Art
The patent office, which evaluates patentability (validity) of pro-
posed claims, but does not consider infringement issues, has long ap-
plied a rule that in prosecution, section 112(6) is not applicable when
evaluating a claim for patentability over the prior art.23 Prior to Don-
21. Valmont, 983 F.2d at 1043-44 ("A determination of section 112 equivalence does not
involve the equitable tripartite test of the doctrine of equivalents. As this court has stated, 'the
sole question' under section 112 involves comparison of the structure in the accused device
which performs the claimed function to the structure in the specification.").
22. See, e.g., id at 1043. Unless there are "insubstantial changes" (i.e., "colorable
changes") by an "unscrupulous copyist," the equities favor the accused infringer and infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents, which is the "exception" rather than the rule, should not
be found. As another court has noted,
for if the public comes to believe (or fear) that the language of patent claims can
never be relied on, and that the doctrine of equivalents is simply the second prong
of every infringement charge, regularly available to extend protection beyond the
scope of the claims, then claims will cease to serve their intended purpose. Com-
petitors will never know whether their actions infringe a granted patent.
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Analogous arguments can be made for a very limited application of section 112 equivalents.
See also Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Wamer-Jenkinson Co., Inc., No. 93-1088, 1993 WL
502162 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 12, 1993). In Hilton, the Federal Circuit agreed sua sponte to consider en
banc:
(1) whether infringement under the doctrine of equivalents requires more than the Graver
Tank tripartite test being met-i.e., the test laid out in Graver Tank & Manufacturing Co. v.
Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950), that infringement exists where the accused device
performs substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to achieve substantially
the same result as the claimed invention;
(2) whether application of the doctrine is in the court's discretion when there is no literal
infringement of equivalents; and
(3) whether the doctrine of equivalents provides an equitable remedy to be determined by
the court, or involves fact issues for the jury.
En Banc Federal Circuit Will Review Doctrine of Equivalents and Equity, 47 PATEMrs,
TRADEMARK & CoPYRIGHT JOURNAL (BNA) 133-34 (Dec. 9, 1993). Oral argument was heard
on March 9, 1994. En Banc Federal Circuit Hears Argument on Doctrine of Equivalents and
Equity, 47 PATm, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT JOURNAL (BNA) 442-44 (Mar. 17, 1994).
23. A different rule of construction is applied in an interference setting, and for statutory
subject matter determinations as discussed below.
An interference "typically" arises when a patent applicant becomes aware of an issued pat-
ent whose claims cover the same invention as the applicant's. The applicant then amends his
application to include claims copied from the issued patent in order to provoke an interference.
As a result of the copied claim, which is referred to as the "count," there is a clear conflict of
priority between the patent application and the issued patent, which include claims that are iden-
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aldson, a means-plus-function limitation was construed during prose-
cution as literally covering all means (structures) for performing the
claimed function.2" Thus, during original prosecution, it was possible
for the patent office to rely on prior art to reject claims for which the
prior art disclosed the claimed function, but disclosed no specific
structure for performing the function.25 Likewise, in reexamination, a
requester could successfully urge that claims should be reexamined
and ultimately cancelled based on prior art that disclosed the claimed
function, but disclosed no specific structure for performing the
function.
D. The Anomaly: The Patent Office vs. Litigation
An anomaly therefore existed. A claim might be rejected in pros-
ecution as being unpatentable over the prior art because the function
recited in a means-plus-function limitation is disclosed by the prior
art. However, the same claim might be held valid in litigation because
the prior art did not disclose a structure for performing the claimed
tical on their faces and thus cover identical inventions. The applicant may then request the
Commissioner to declare an interference, so that the priority of the conflicting claims may be
determined.
While this is a "typical" interference scenario, there are many variations. For example, an
interference may be declared between two pending applications. The examiner may suggest to
one or both applicants a claim to insert in order to provoke an interference. Also, the count may
not correspond directly to a claim in either the application or issued patent. The regulations for
interference practice are set out in 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.601-1.690 (1993).
When interpretation is required of a claim copied to provoke an interference, the copied
claim is viewed in the context of the patent from which it is copied, and that is true for "means
for" language as well. In re Spina, 975 F.2d 854, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1992). For example, assume
Party A has a patent and Party B has an application into which he copies a claim from Party A's
patent in order to provoke an interference. The "means" language is construed in light of Party
A's specification to determine the corresponding structures and equivalents thereof. If Party B
does not have support for that claim as so interpreted, he cannot make the count. If Party B has a
chain of applications claiming priority, the issue is which is the earliest application in the chain
to support the claim as so interpreted. See Mukherjee v. Lai, I F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 1993)(Fed-
eral Circuit vacated and remanded the Board's decision in part because the Board erred in con-
cluding that the senior party's application supported the "high dielectric constant" limitation
explicitly recited in count 2 (and counts 3 and 4 depending therefrom) and read into the "means
for injecting hot electrons onto the floating gate" limitation in count I in accordance with 35
U.S.C. § 112(6)).
24. In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A. 1957); Application of Sweet, 393 F.2d 837
(C.C.P.A. 1968).
25. See Harry F. Manbeck, Applicability of the Last Paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 to
Patentability Determinations Before the Patent and Trademark Office, (hereinafter PTO Notice)
1134 OF. GAz. PAT. OFICE 631,636 (Jan. 7, 1992), reprinted in 1135 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OMcE 8
(Feb. 4, 1992) (discussing the patent office's sweeping and long-standing practice of ignoring
section 112(6) and construing means plus function limitations so as to cover any means for
performing the function, such that a prior art reference that met the recited function met the
limitation).
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function that was the same as, or equivalent to, or an obvious variant
of, the structure disclosed in the patent specification for performing
the claimed function.
A similar anomoly existed with respect to reexamination pro-
ceedings. A third party charged with infringement could seek to in-
validate claims of the subject patent in a reexamination proceeding
where the "means for" limitations would be met by prior art disclosing
the claimed function. In contrast, in litigation, the claims would sur-
vive because the prior art structure was not the same as or equivalent
to the structure disclosed in the patent.26
Thus, it is not surprising that third parties sued for infringement
have sought reexamination and a stay of the litigation pending the
results of the reexamination when the asserted claims include limita-
tions written in means-plus-function language."
E. The Federal Circuit's Unsuccessful Efforts to Control the
Patent Office
The Federal Circuit, concluding that such an anomaly was intol-
erable and contrary to what it perceived to be the literal language of
section 112(6), has on a number of recent occasions directed the pat-
ent office to apply section 112(6) in prosecution.28 But the patent of-
fice repeatedly refused to follow the Federal Circuit's directives. In a
Notice in the Official Gazette (hereinafter, the "PTO Notice"), then-
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Harry F. Manbeck, ex-
plained the basis for the patent office's refusal to comply with the
26. Another advantage is that in litigation every claim of a patent is presumed to be valid.
35 U.S.C. § 282. This presumption may only be overcome by "clear and convincing" evidence.
Lindemann Maschinenfabrik v. AM. Hoist and Derrick, 730 F.2d 1452, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Additionally, "in determining validity, a claim must be construed to uphold its validity if possi-
ble.' Lewmar Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1987). However, in
reexamination there is no presumption of validity. In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en
banc). Claims subject to reexamination are to be "given their broadest reasonable interpretation
consistent with the specification." In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 198 4 )(quot-
ing In re Reuter, 651 F.2d 751, 756 (C.C.P.A. 1981)). One rationale for this difference in treat-
ment is that, in original prosecution and in reexamination of an unexpired patent, the applicant or
patentee may amend or add claims so there is no reason to leave any doubt as to the intended
scope of the claims. In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 858-89 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (reexamina-
tion); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (original prosecution).
27. Stays of patent infringement actions pending the patent office's reexamination of the
validity of the claims of the patent-in-suit are commonplace when the case is in its early stages.
See, e.g., Loffland Bros. Co. v. Mid-Western Energy Corp., 225 U.S.P.Q. 886, 887 (W.D. Okla.
1985); Emhart Industries v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1889, 1890 (N.D. I11. 1987); and
GPAC, Inc. v. D.W.W. Enterprises, Inc., 144 F.R.D. 60 (D.NJ. 1992).
28. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833 (Fed. Cir. 1990)(reh'g denied); In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d
1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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Federal Circuit's orders.29 The PTO Notice, however, indicated that
the patent office might agree to apply section 112(6) in prosecution if
that was the decision of an en banc panel of the Federal Circuit.
30
According to Commissioner Manbeck, there is early and well-settled
precedent authorizing the patent office to construe claims in prosecu-
tion without reference to section 112(6).' That precedent includes
decisions from the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals (CCPA), the
predecessor court to the Federal Circuit, whose decisions have been
adopted by the Federal Circuit as controlling precedent that it is bound
to follow. 32 Only an en banc panel of the Federal Circuit can overturn
such precedent-panel decisions are of no legal effect. 3 Accord-
ingly, the patent office continued to follow this earlier controlling
CCPA precedent, rather than contrary panel decisions by the Federal
Circuit.
II. THE DONALDSON AND ALAPPAT DEcIsIONS
A. The Federal Circuit's Decision in Donaldson Should Bring
The Patent Office in Line
In Donaldson, the Board affirmed the Examiner's rejection of
claims in a reexamination proceeding as being unpatentable over prior
art. In reaching that conclusion, the Examiner and the Board inter-
preted means-plus-function language consistent with patent office
practice and the CCPA precedent, ignoring section 112(6) so that each
means-plus-function limitation was deemed to cover all means for
performing the claimed function.34 More specifically, in Donaldson,
29. PTO Notice, supra note 25.
30. d
31. Id., (citing In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543 (C.C.P.A. 1957); In re Sweet, 393 F.2d 837
(C.C.P.A. 1968)). Scholars differ on the issue of whether these CCPA decisions in fact stand for
the proposition that "means plus function" claims are to be construed as covering all means for
performing the claimed function. See Silverberg, supra note 19, at 678-682 (arguing an interpre-
tation of the CCPA cases that does not establish such binding precedent); Wesley W. Whitmyer,
Jr., The Patent and Trademark Office's Refusal to Follow In re Bond, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. Soc'y 397, 400 (1992) (arguing that In re Knowlton, 481 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973),
supersedes prior CCPA precedent and requires that § 112(6) be applied in patentability determi-
nations before the patent office); R. Carl Moy, The Interpretation of Means Expression During
Prosecution, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 246 (1986) (agreeing that the CCPA prece-
dent requires a literal reading of the means-plus-function limitation).
32. South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1982)(en banc).
33. "This court has adopted the rule that prior decisions of a panel of the court are binding
precedent on subsequent panels unless and until overturned en banc. Where there is a direct
conflict, the precedential decision is the first." Newell Companies, Inc. v. Kenney Mfg. Co., 864
F.2d 757, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
34. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193 (quoting a portion of the Board decision in which the
Board concluded that the structure provided in the specification was irrelevant to the patentabil-
ity analysis); id. at 1194 (noting the unsuccessful argument by the Commissioner that disregard-
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the patentee appealed from a decision of the Board, reaffirmed on re-
consideration, sustaining the Examiner's rejection of claim 1 of a pat-
ent in reexamination, under 35 U.S.C. § 103.35 The patent in
reexamination related to industrial air-filtering devices often referred
to as "dust collectors." Claim 1 was an apparatus claim reciting an
"air filter assembly for filtering air laden with particulate matter, said
assembly [10] comprising: [a plurality of elements]." 36 For purposes
of the appeal, the patentee conceded that a single prior art reference
(Swift) met every limitation in claim 1 except for the limitation of a
"means, responsive to pressure increases in said chamber caused by
said cleaning means, for moving particulate matter in a downward di-
rection" recited in the last clause of claim 1. 3 7
The Board held that the last limitation was also met by Swift
because the recited function was disclosed by Swift.38 The Board re-
jected the patentee's argument that the structure corresponding to the
means in Swift was not equivalent to the structure disclosed in the
patent in reexamination, which was a "flexible wall, diaphragm-like
structure." 39  The Board did not interpret the "means" as limited to
the flexible wall, diaphragm-like structure disclosed in the patentee's
specification, and equivalents thereof.40 Those structural limitations
were found in other claims, including claims 2 and 3 depending from
claim 1 and, according to the Board, would not be implied within the
meaning of the "means" recited in claim 1.41
B. The Federal Circuit, Sitting En Bane, Overrules the Board
in Donaldson
The Federal Circuit agreed to consider en banc the patentee's
appeal of the Board's decision in Donaldson.42 Subsequently, eleven
members of the Federal Circuit issued a unanimous en banc decision
reversing the Board's decision and holding that the patent office must
construe means-plus-function claim elements during prosecution-
original prosecution and reexamination-the same way that courts
construe such claim elements during litigation.43 In other words, the
ing section 112(6) for patent office patentability determinations was consistent with "the PTO's
sweeping and long-standing practice of not applying paragraph 6 during examination.").
35. Idl at 1190.
36. Id. at 1191.
37. Id at 1192.
38. Id at 1192.
39. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1196.
40. Id. at 1192.
41. Id at 1196-97.
42. Id at 1189.
43. Id at 1193.
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patent office must construe the element under section 112(6) as being
limited to the structure disclosed in the patent specification for per-
forming the claimed function and equivalents thereof. If the prior art
does not disclose the same structure, or an equivalent structure, the
claim element is not literally met and the claim is not anticipated
under section 102. If the prior art does not provide a teaching that
renders the claimed structure or its equivalent obvious, then the claim
is not obvious under section 103. Hence a claim that, pre-Donaldson,
would have been rejected during prosecution as being anticipated be-
cause the prior art disclosed the claimed function, might now be al-
lowed during prosecution because the prior art failed to disclose the
same or equivalent structure as disclosed in the patent specification or
an obvious variation thereof.
The Federal Circuit ruled that "[t]o the extent that In re Lund-
berg, In re Arbeit, or any other precedent of this court suggests or
holds to the contrary, it is expressly overruled."'  The Federal Circuit
had no difficulty in rejecting each and every argument posited by the
Commissioner for a different interpretation. For example, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the language of section 112(6) was clear and
unambiguous, requiring that a claim for a combination expressed in
means-plus-function format "shall be construed to cover the corre-
sponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof," making no distinction between litigation and
prosecution.45 The Federal Circuit found no evidence of Congres-
sional intent to the contrary, and determined that it would give no
deference to the patent office's long-standing interpretation of the stat-
ute, which was simply wrong.4 6 The Federal Circuit refused to con-
sider relevant the interpretation given to the language by P.J. Federico,
a principal drafter of the statutory language who was then an Exam-
iner-in-Chief, finding his "personal" opinion to be no evidence of
Congressional intent.47 The Federal Circuit opined that its holding
44. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193-94 (citations omitted).
45. Il at 1193.
46. Id. at 1194, 1193 n.3.
47. In his 1954 commentary on the 1952 Patent Act, PJ. Federico explained:
The paragraph ends by stating that such a claim shall be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and
equivalents thereof. This relates primarily to the construction of such claims for
the purpose of determining when the claim is infringed (note the use of the word
"cover"), and would not appear to have much, if any, applicability in determining
the patentability of such claims over the prior art, that is, the Patent Office is not
authorized to allow a claim which "reads on" the prior art.
Federico, supra note 12, at 186-87.
The Federal Circuit, however, found such writings unpersuasive because: (1) the Commen-
tary "is not legislative history per se that may be relied upon to indicate Congressional intent;"
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was consistent with the principle that claims are to be given their
"broadest reasonable interpretation" during prosecution 4 8-it simply
held that the "broadest reasonable interpretation" that an Examiner
may give means-plus-function language is the broadest interpretation
consistent with the mandates of section 112(6).49 The Federal Circuit
also explained that limitations found only in the specification were not
being read into a claim; instead, as in litigation, the meaning of the
"means" limitation in the claim is merely being properly interpreted in
light of the specification as required by the statute.5 0
The Federal Circuit also concluded that its holding did not con-
flict with the second paragraph of section 112, which provides: "The
specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the ap-
plicant regards as his invention."51 The Federal Circuit opined:
Indeed, we agree with the general principle espoused in In re Lund-
berg, 244 F.2d at 547-48, 113 U.S.P.Q. at 534 (C.C.P.A. 1979),
that the sixth paragraph of section 112 does not exempt an appli-
cant from the requirements of the first two paragraphs of that sec-
tion. Although paragraph six statutorily provides that one may use
means-plus-function language in a claim, one is still subject to the
requirement that a claim "particularly point out and distinctly
claim" the invention. Therefore, if one employs means-plus-func-
tion language in a claim, one must set forth in the specification an
adequate disclosure showing what is meant by that language. If an
applicant fails to set forth an adequate disclosure, the applicant has
in effect failed to particularly point out and distinctly claim the in-
vention as required by the second paragraph of section 112.52
This dialogue is important because it indicates that a specification that
does not adequately disclose a structure corresponding to the claimed
"means" may render the claim invalid.53
and (2) "the comments contained therein do not suggest that Federico knew of any particular
intent by Congress regarding the manner in which the sixth paragraph, then the third paragraph,
should be applied;" and (3) Federico "was merely stating his personal views." Donaldson, 16
F.3d at 1193, n.3.
The Federal Circuit's selective reliance on Mr. Federico's writings is curious-in a decision
one year earlier the Federal Circuit relied on Mr. Federico's interpretation of section 112(6) in
interpreting the scope of that section. Valmont Industries, Inc. v. Reinke Manufacturing Co., 983
F.2d 1039, 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
48. See, e.g., In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
49. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1194-95.
50. Id. at 1194-95.
51. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
52. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1195.
53. This was likely in part a response to the line of questioning posed by Judge Nies during
oral argument in which she asked "What is the support for the equivalents?" Judge Neis was
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The Federal Circuit then reviewed the specification and con-
cluded that the rigid wall hopper design disclosed in the Swift prior art
reference was not th same as or equivalent to the flexible-wall, dia-
phragm-like structure disclosed in the specification, and would not
have been obvious based on such prior art. 4 As it had done a year
earlier when construing section 112(6) in an infringement context,55
the Federal Circuit declined the opportunity to announce an explicit
test for determining the existence of a structural equivalent,56 but nev-
ertheless ddrcluded that a structure was not equivalent if it failed to
operate substantially the same way as the structure disclosed in the
patent specification. Particularly, the Federal Circuit concludedthat
the prior art hopper walls would not vibrate in response to pressure
increases caused by pulse-jet cleaning and thus were not the
equivalent of (and further did not render obvious) the flexible-wall,
diaphragm-like structure disclosed in the subject patent as correspond-
ing to the "means, responsive to pressure" language recited in claim
1.17 The Federal Circuit thus reversed the Board's decision. It would
seem that the patent office now has little practical alternative but to
follow the Federal Circuit's en banc decision in Donaldson.58
concerned that "You don't have to have support in your specification for the equivalents because
you don't know what they are." See Webman, supra note 13, at 61.
54. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1195-97.
55. See supra notes 20-22.
56. The Federal Circuit commented: "The word 'equivalent' in 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph
6, should not be confused with the doctrine of equivalents:' Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1195 n.8.
This is consistent with the Federal Circuit's approach in the infringement context. See surpa
note 14.
57. The Federal Circuit did not address in any meaningful way the patent office's "Policy
Consideration" argument to the effect that the "PTO's workload will increase' without the bene-
fit of live testimony and testing facilities, the PTO will have to resolve structural equivalency";
and "it would be impractical for the PTO to attempt to apply the last clause of § 112's final
paragraph when comparing prior art to claims in ex parte prosecution. PTO Notice, supra note
30, at 635.
58. The author has been advised that the Assistant Commissioner's office is reviewing the
case and has not yet made a policy determination. One option is to petition the U.S. Supreme
Court to review the Federal Circuit's decision. However, such a review is rarely granted. One
possibility might be for the Commissioner to argue that under a controversial Supreme Court
decision, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), it
is the patent office and not the Federal Circuit that is primarily responsible for interpreting the
Patent Act, and that the Federal Circuit must defer to its determination unless that determination
is not reasonable or is contrary to clear (unambiguous) Congressional intent. However, one
commentator recently explored this issue in considerable depth and concluded that such a posi-
tion would be untenable for a number of compelling reasons. See R. Carl Moy, Judicial Defer-
ence to the PTO's Interpretation of the Patent Law, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OF. Soc'Y 397
(1992).
[Note: On May 17, 1994, while this article was in press, the patent office issued guidelines
for interpreting claims in light of the Donaldson decision; see section IV, "Epilog," infra for a
discussion of these guidelines.]
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As a final point, it should be noted that, in Donaldson, the Fed-
eral Circuit concluded that its holding will be applicable "regardless
of the context in which the interpretation of means-plus-function lan-
guage arises, i.e., whether as part of a patentability determination in
the PTO or as part of a validity or infringement determination in a
court.' 59 In other words, "paragraph six facially covers every situa-
tion involving the interpretation of means-plus-function language.
60
In a footnote, the Federal Circuit then made it clear that "regardless of
the context" meant just that, by citing cases in which section 112(6)
was applied to various validity and patentability issues, including, for
example, the evaluation of whether a claim recites statutory subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.61 This provides insight as to how the
Federal Circuit will soon rule in another case, In re Alappat,62 dis-
cussed in the next section.
C. The Federal Circuit's En Banc Review of Ex parte
Alappat
A patent claim cannot be directed to a "mathematical algorithm"
(or an "abstract mathematical formula") since such an algorithm is not
patentable subject matter within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101,
which defines patentable subject matter as any "new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof.... 6 3 A mathematical algorithm is "a
procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem," 64 in
which mathematical values or coded representations thereof ("process
inputs") are subjected to procedural steps (e.g., manipulations; compu-
tations; comparisons; conversions; logical, arithmetic or algebraic op-
erations; and the like) to arrive at certain other mathematical values or
coded representations thereof ("process outputs") representing the "so-
lution" to the "mathematical problem." 65 The test for determining
whether a mathematical algorithm is being claimed is beyond the
59. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1193 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 1194 (emphasis added).
61. Idl at 1193 n.4.
62. See In re Alappat, 980 F.2d 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Ex Parte Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d
1340 (B.P.A.I. 1992).
63. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 568 n.8 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64
n.2 (1972); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 903 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
64. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 n.1
(1978).
65. See In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32,34-45,38-39 (C.C.P.A. 1979); and In re Logan, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d 1465 (B.P.A.I. 1991).
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scope of this article.' What this article addresses, however, is the use
of "means plus function" language relative to the issue of whether a
nonstatutory mathematical algorithm is being claimed.
Assume that a method claim is directed to a nonstatutory mathe-
matical algorithm. It is settled law that statutory subject matter may
be presented by converting the method claim into an apparatus claim
by changing each recited step to a "means for" performing that step
under section 112(6) and describing the interconnection or interrela-
tionship between such means and structures.6 7 The nonstatutory
mathematical algorithm is converted to a statutory "machine" or
"manufacture" since the claim as a whole defines an apparatus in the
form" of a combination of interrelated structures. 6
But what if the interrelationship of the "means for" elements are
not recited in the claim? That is the subject of Ex parte Alappat,69 and
the Federal Circuit's en banc review thereof. CCPA precedent also
provided that, under section 112(6), "claims under 35 U.S.C. 101
drafted in means plus function format are to be examined in light of
the 'corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specifi-
cation and equivalent thereof.' "70 Nevertheless, where the disclosure
is such that the means elements may read on a "general purpose data
processor of known type operating under the control of a stored pro-
gram," such claims are treated as indistinguishable from method
claims for purposes of section 101 unless it is demonstrated that the
claims are drawn to specific apparatus distinct from other apparatus
capable of performing the identical functions.71
In Ex parte Alappat, a panel of the Board, expanded to include
then-Commissioner Manbeck, Deputy Commissioner Comer, and As-
sistant Commissioner Samuelson, addressed on reconsideration an ap-
paratus claim on a rasterizer for converting vectors Jn a data list. The
66. See, generally, Stephen G. Kunin, Patentability of Computer Programs Related Inven-
tions in the United States Patent & Trademark Office, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 149
(March 1994); John Land, Patent Protection of Computer Software, PRoTocoL (Spensley Horn
Jubas & Lubitz, San Diego, Cal.), Fall 1990 at 1; and Lee E. Barrett, Patentable Subject Matter:
Mathematical Algorithms and Computer Programs, 1106 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 5 (Sept. 5,
1989).
67. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
68. l. Alternatively, one could change each recited step to a specific structure for per-
forming that step as was the case with some of the claims in In re Akamatsu, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
1915, 1922-23 (B.P.A.I. 1992) (Board rejected independent apparatus claim 6 as being directed
to nonstatutory mathematical algorithm, but allowed independent apparatus claim 8 which lim-
ited two of the means to including a 4-bit-shifted wired-logic, and limited a third means to
including a one-bit-shifted wired logic).
69. 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1340 (B.P.A.I. 1992).
70. In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 796 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
71. 1l at 796 n.3, quoting In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 916 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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claim recited four "means plus function" limitations. The applica-
tion's specification disclosed Arithmetic Logic Units (ALUs), barrel
shifters, and Read-Only Memories (ROMs) as the structures in a spe-
cial purpose hardware implementation of the invention corresponding
to the "means" recited in the claim. Nevertheless, the Board ruled that
the claim recited a nonstatutory mathematical algorithm, refusing to
interpret the claimed "means" elements in full accordance with section
112(6). The Board explained that "[w]hen claims are drafted in the
form of 'means for' performing method steps it is difficult to tell
whether the invention is to a method which has been drafted entirely
in 'means for' apparatus form to evade the § 101 inquiry, or whether
the invention is really to a new apparatus for performing a nonstatu-
tory process, which apparatus would be statutory subject matter."7"
For that reason, the patent office treats "claims entirely in 'means for'
terms as indistinguishable from the method in § 101 determinations
[in order to] shift the burden onto the applicant to show how the
claims truly define specific apparatus."73 '"The applicant is required to
demonstrate that the claims define specific apparatus, as opposed to
'other apparatus capable of performing identical function."'74 More-
over, "where a 'means for' claim does not distinguish over a digital
computer operating on a stored program ... it is proper to treat the
claim as indistinguishable from a method claim."'
Here, according to the Board, the subject claim "as drafted, reads
on a general purpose digital computer means to perform the various
steps under program control," so it was "proper to treat the claim as if
drawn to a method."76 The patent office "will not presume that a
stored program digital computer is not within the section 112(6) range
of equivalents of structure disclosed in the specification."77 If that
was as far as the Board had gone, its decision would not necessarily
have been totally inconsistent with Donaldson. The Board would
merely be concluding that the structures disclosed in the specification
corresponding to the means are so conventional that they would be
entitled to a virtually unlimited breadth of equivalents so that the
mathematical algorithm was in effect being preempted.78
72. In re Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1342-43.
73. Id. at 1343.
74. Id. at 1342.
75. Id. at 1343.
76. Id. at 1345.
77. In re Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1345.
78. Gottsehalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 72 (1972) ("Mhe patent would wholly pre-empt
the mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.").
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But the Board went even further. The Board held that its deci-
sion would be the same
[e]ven if appellants were Willing to- admit that a stored program
digital computer were not within the range of equivalents.... It is
improper to presume that 'conventional structure in the art' and-its
equivalents limit the claimed means for performing functions to
less than any and every means. Even if the range of equivalents
could be determined at the time of examination or applicant were
willing to admit to a range of equivalents under § 112 6, § 112
2 requires that the claim particularly point out and define the appa-
ratus, i.e., what is and is not within the scope of the claim.
79
Thus, the Board in effect concluded that at least where conven-
tional prior art structures are disclosed in the specification as corre-
sponding to each means, the Board will draw an irrebuttable
presumption that an equivalent includes a general purpose digital com-
puter operating under program control, and any other means for per-
forming the functions recited in the claims. That is, the author
submits, inconsistent with Donaldson.
The Federal Circuit agreed to consider en banc the appeal of the
Board's decision.8 0 If the Federal Circuit meant what it said in Don-
aldson, it will likely reverse the Board for failing to apply section
112(6) in evaluating whether a claim recites statutory subject matter.
D. Possible Ramifications of the Federal Circuit's Recent
Decisions
The practical impact of the foregoing decisions cannot be pre-
dicted with any degree of certainty. Much will depend on the Federal
Circuit's decision in Alappat and the rules and procedures adopted and
implemented by the patent office thereafter. Nevertheless, a few com-
ments and suggestions are warranted in light of what we do know
from the Federal Circuit's recent decisions and the comments made by
the judges of that esteemed body during oral argument in Donaldson
and Alappat.
Means-plus-function limitations should not be used as the exclu-
sive or even primary claim format for obtaining broad patent protec-
tion. Under the recent Federal Circuit precedent, such as Laitram and
Valmont, there should be substantial concern that the scope of section
112(6) equivalents will be narrow, even if there are dependent claims
further defining the structure of the means recited in an independent
claim. When means-plus-function language is to be employed, it is
79. In re Alappat, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1345.
80. In re Alappat, 980 F.2d 1439, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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absolutely imperative that the specification adequately describe the
corresponding structure in broad language, specifying as many exam-
ples as possible. Where appropriate, it would be desirable to state in
the specification that any means having a certain capability or charac-
teristic will be adequate. This will increase the likelihood that in liti-
gation the claim language will be afforded a broad range of section
112(6) equivalents.81
Practitioners should resist the temptation to utilize means-plus-
function language where it is difficult to locate the specific structures
that correspond to the "means" recited in the claim. That is often the
case, unfortunately, where the means claims are first added after an
application has been filed. Care needs to be taken to ensure that the
structure corresponding to the claimed means is readily discernible
from the specification and drawings. Otherwise there will be in-
creased risk that an accused infringer will be positioned to argue suc-
cessfully that the structure corresponding to the means limitation
embraces a multitude of different elements disclosed in the specifica-
tion, one or more of which may be absent from the accused device.
Alternatively, there will be the definite possibility that the patent of-
fice will reject the claim as failing to satisfy the requirement of section
112(2). Indeed, it would not be surprising for the patent office to now
adopt rules requiring that the applicant identify the structures in the
specification corresponding to each means recited in a claim as a pre-
condition to allowance of any claim utilizing means-plus-function
language.
There should be a recognition of the possibility that the patent
office may issue two patents to the same or different entities, contain-
ing claims with identical language but to be afforded substantially dif-
ferent scope. At oral argument in Alappat, Chief Judge Nies offered
her concern that multiple patents could be granted to the same or dif-
ferent entities with the identically worded means-plus-function claims,
yet they would have different constructions. This would be the case,
for example, if Texas Instruments were to obtain further calculator
patents, now, twenty years after obtaining its original patents, simply
because the specifications would be different from the calculator pat-
ents of twenty years ago.82
81. Of course, this should also preclude the party from arguing, during prosecution or in
litigation, that a structure disclosed in a prior art reference as having such capability or character-
istic is not the equivalent of the structures disclosed in the specification corresponding to a
means limitation in a claim.
82. See Webman, supra note 13, at 55.
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Though it would appear to be a circumvention of the Federal Cir-
cuit's decision in Donaldson, one should at least muse over the possi-
bility that the patent office will respond by adopting policies and
procedures that limit when means-plus-function limitations may be
utilized. At the oral argument in Alappat, Judges Newman and Nies
both indicated that the patent office might decline to allow means-
plus-function language for an element in a claim where patentability
rested solely on the structure corresponding to the means.8 3 In effect,
Judge Nies' question-"Should there be a reevaluation of claim draft-
ing rather than legal interpretation" 8a-would be answered in the af-
firmative. This might square nicely with the language of the statute,
which states that "[a]n element in a claim for a combination may be
expressed" in means-plus-function format, which, if construed liber-
ally, would allow the patent office to adopt rules as to when such a
claim is appropriate. That should be contrasted with the further lan-
guage of the statute that when means-plus-function language is used, it
"shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or
acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof"-the deci-
sion in Donaldson was bottomed on that mandatory language. Such a
patent office policy would likewise not run counter to the principle
that section 112(6) overruled the Supreme Court's decision in Halli-
burton.8 5 In Halliburton, patentability of the claim at issue rested in
the function recited in the means-plus-function limitation; it was not
dependent on the structure of the means for performing the function. 6
Thus, the proposed policy of the patent office would continue its prac-
tice of allowing means-plus-function language in a Halliburton-type
situation. Means-plus-function language would be disallowed only
where the function was known or obvious and patentability resided
solely in the structure disclosed in the specification for performing the
function, a circumstance not presented in Halliburton.
Another approach the Federal Circuit might take in Alappat is to
use its en banc status as an opportunity to reverse prior precedent set
by three-judge panels, and limit section 112(6) equivalents to struc-
tures that are known as of the date the application is filed. That would
be consistent with the concept that the "specification shall contain a
written description of the invention" under section 112(1). A patent
specification can at most be said to contain a written description of
structures explicitly recited therein and known equivalents. The speci-
83. See id. at 56-58 and 63-64.
84. See id. at 58.
85. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
86. Halliburton, 329 U.S. I (1946).
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fication cannot properly be said to contain a written description of
future structural equivalents. That would leave the doctrine of
equivalents, an equivalence determined at the time of infringement,
for litigation.
One should expect the patent office to adopt a rule that, whenever
the prior art meets the functional recitation of a means-plus-function
limitation, the structure disclosed in the prior art will be presumed to
be the structural equivalent of the structures disclosed in the patent
specification. The burden will then shift to the applicant (or patentee
in reexamination) to articulate cogent reasons why the two are not
equivalent. Further anticipate that if the Examiner is persuaded to al-
low the claim, he will provide in a Statement of Reasons for Allow-
ance a narrow construction of the scope of equivalents that he gave the
means limitation in order to allow the claim. That Statement will no
doubt be cited by accused infringers.
Patent applicants should scrutinize each means-plus-function lim-
itation to ascertiin whether the interrelationship of elements can be
adequately defined and distinguished over the prior art without the
need for the means element. For example, it would be more desirable
to recite "A coupled to B" than "A, B and means for coupling A to B."
The latter would limit the scope of the scope of the claim to products
having a coupling means that is at least equivalent to the ones dis-
closed in the patent specification. 7
Due care should be taken before filing a request for reexamina-
tion of an issued patent based on prior art. Often, a requester relies on
prior art that teaches the function recited in the claims of a challenged
patent, but is sparse on the structures for performing those functions.
Many Japanese patent applications, laid open for inspection, meet that
description, as do most IBM technical disclosure bulletins and various
other technical articles. Before Donaldson, reexaminations relying on
such art have been quite successful. The claims were rejected and
cancelled because the means limitations were construed as reading on
any and all means for performing the recited function. Now, however,
the patentee will have the opportunity to present arguments as to why
the structure (if any) disclosed in the prior art reference is not the
equivalent of and does not render obvious the structure disclosed in
the patent specification. If carefully orchestrated, such an argument
87. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. IQ Technologies Inc., 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1477 (BNA) (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of non-infringement predicated on a
ruling by the district court that a limitation of "connector means for electrical connection" was
limited to "male-female type plugs and equivalents thereof for electrical connection" and did not
encompass pads soldered to pins as in the accused product. The Federal Circuit rejected the
argument that since it was an electrical connection any electrical connection should suffice.)
286 [Vol. 10
MEANS-PLUS-FUNCTION CLAIMS
might not preclude the patentee from subsequently arguing in litiga-
tion that the corresponding structure in the accused device is the
equivalent of the structure disclosed in the patent. This is possible
because the structures in the accused device and the patent, specifica-
tion are often much closer to one another (i.e., "equivalent" to one
another) than they are to the structure disclosed in the prior art to
which neither is equivalent.
IH. CONCLUSION
Unless and until the Supreme Court agrees to hear a substantive
patent case, which it has not done since the formation of the Federal
Circuit, the Federal Circuit is the final arbiter of patent issues. The
Federal Circuit has not been shy about reversing prior precedent, sit-
ting en banc where necessary to achieve its objective. The area of
means-plus-function claims is only one of many areas at which the
Federal Circuit is taking aim. It is imperative for any firm prosecuting
patent applications in the United States, or enforcing patents or de-
fending against charges of infringement in the United States, to be
current on the most recent decisions of the Federal Circuit. That in-
cludes both published and unpublished decisions, the latter often pro-
viding keen insight as to where the court is going. Tread carefully.
The law as it exists today may very well not be .the law tomorrow.
IV. EPILOGUE
After this article was completed and while it was awaiting publi-
cation, the patent office issued a notice in the May 17, 1994 Official
Gazette entitled Examination Guidelines for Claims Reciting A
"Means or Step Plus Function" Limitation In Accordance With 35
U.S.C. § 112, 6th Paragraph.8 In that notice, the patent office stated
that it would follow the Federal Circuit's holding in Donaldson.
Therefore, "effective immediately, examiners shall interpret a § 112,
6th paragraph 'means or step plus function' limitation in a claim as
limited to the corresponding structure, materials or acts described in
the specification and equivalents thereof in accordance with the fol-
lowing guidelines."89 These guidelines were "distributed to patent ex-
aminers for guidance on examining practice and procedure relating to
limitations falling under 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6th paragraph, after Donald-
son,... [and] will be incorporated into the Manual of Patent Examin-
88. 1162 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE 59 (May 17, 1994).
89. l4
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ing Procedure" (MPEP). The guidelines set out in this notice are
interesting in a number of particulars.
A. Applicability of Section 112(6)
The patent office addressed the issue of "Identifying a § 112, 6th
Paragraph Limitation."91 The patent office began with the comment
that
[a]lthough there is no magic language that must appear in a claim
in order for it to fall within the scope of § 112, 6th paragraph, it
must be clear that the element in the claim is set forth, at least in
part, by the function it performs as opposed to the specific struc-
ture, material, or acts that perform the function. 92
The patent office then gave six examples that demonstrate that, consis-
tent with its admonition that in prosecution claims be afforded their
broadest reasonable interpretation, clever claim drafting should not
and will not avoid application of section 112(6).
In one example, taken from Exparte Stanley,93 a claim recited "a
jet driving device so constructed and located on the rotor as to drive
the rotor ... .94 In Stanley, the Board held that section 112(6) was
applicable to the recited limitation, finding that "the term 'device'
with respect to its significance and coverage is synonymous with the
term 'means,' "91 and that "[t]he addition of the words 'jet driving' to
the term 'device' merely renders the latter term more definite and spe-
cific."96 Thus, replacing the word "means" with a generic equivalent
such as "device," or "element," or the like, should not affect the appli-
cation of section 112(6). Nor should the applicability of section
112(6) turn on the use of a "tag" or "label" before the word "means"
that does not recite meaningful structure and instead renders more def-
inite the recited function, such as the label "jet driving" in the exam-
ple. (Often the label is nothing more than a restatement of the recited
function, as in another example provided by the patent office in which
a limitation recited a "force generating means adapted to provide [a
force]. . ."9) Neither should the application of section 112(6) be




93. Ex parte Stanley, 121 U.S.P.Q. 621 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App. 1958).
94. 1162 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFiCE at 59, Example (1) and n.2 (emphasis added).
95. Ex parte Stanley, 121 U.S.P.Q. at 627.
96. Ia at 628.
97. 1162 OFF. GAz. PAT. OFFICE at 59, Example 3 and n.4, citing De Graffenreid v. United
States, 20 Cl. Ct. 458, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1326 (Cl. Ct. 1990).
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transitional phrase; for example, "as to" as in the example. Moreover,
adding structure to the "means" does not take the "means plus func-
tion" limitation out of the scope of section 112(6), as was true in an-
other example cited by the patent office in which the limitation was a
"call cost register means, including a digital display for providing a
substantially instantaneous display for. . .,, Adding some structure
to the "means for" limitation does not render section 112(6)
inapplicable.
In another example, taken from dictum in Ex parte Klumb,99 the
patent office noted that the phrase "printing means" and "means for
printing" both fall within the ambit of section 112(6).100 According to
the Board in Klumb, "we see no necessity for construing the statute to
require a particular grammatic construction, so long as the modifier of
that term specifies a function to be performed."' 1  In Klumb, the
Board also indicated that, while "latch means" might be construed as a
"means for latching" and, therefore, within the purview of section
112(6),101 the phrase "wing means" or "plate means" would not be
construed within the meaning of section 112(6).103 According to the
Board, the phrases "means for winging" or "means for plating" were
obviously not pertinent to the invention claimed. Therefore, the claim
was properly rejected as being indefinite under section 112(1).104
In two other examples, the patent office made clear that it would
be applying section 112(6) to method claims."0 5 As noted above, sec-
tion 112(6) provides that
[a]n element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a
means or step for performing a specified function without the reci-
tal of structure, material, or acts1° 6 in support thereof, and such
claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, mate-
rial, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
While no case known to the author, and certainly no Federal Circuit
decision, has applied section 112(6) to a method claim in the context
of an infringement inquiry, the patent office has cited a few cases in
98. 1162 OFF. GAz. PAT. OmcE at 59, Example 4 and n.5, citing Intellicall Inc. v. Pho-
nometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
99. Ex parte Klumb, 159 U.S.P.Q. 694, 695 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App. 1968).
100. 1162 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFFICE at 59, Example (2) and n.3.
101. Ex parte Klumb, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 695.
102. Id at 695.
103. Id at 695, 696.
104. Id.
105. See supra note 12 for a discussion of this issue.
106. The guidelines provide that the terms "step" and "act" are related much the same way
that "means" and "structure" are related. 1162 OFF. GAz. PAT. OmIcE at 60 ("acts (e.g. steps)").
1994]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
which section 112(6) has been applied to a method claim for purposes
of determining patentability.
More specifically, in one example, taken from In re Roberts,10 7
the claim recited a "method of corrugating polyethylene terephthalate
film which comprises ... reducing the coefficient of friction of the
resulting film below about 0.40 as determined by the Bell test."108
The specification of the patent application being examined described a
three-step process for reducing the coefficient of friction as
claimed. 1 9 The examiner and the Board rejected the claim in part for
being "indefinite" for the use of a "functional" limitation reciting "re-
ducing the coefficient of friction," which was regarded as "not a step
but the result of an unstated step." 110 In other words, the examiner
and Board concluded that the claim would need to recite specific steps
for reducing the coefficient of friction, not only the results achieved by
performing those steps.
The CCPA, however, reversed, concluding that recitation of a
-functional step-reducing the coefficient of friction-was authorized
by then-section 112(3) (now section 112(6))."' The CCPA thus ap-
peared to apply the statute to a method claim. While it is debatable,
the CCPA decision can be read for the proposition that the functional
step recited is construed under the statute to be limited to the three-
step process described in the specification for reducing the coefficient
of friction and equivalents thereof. The patent office has certainly
construed the decision in that fashion and cited it for that proposition.
In the guidelines, the patent office notes that the claim language is a
"step plus function" limitation, and that the omission of the preface
"step for.. ." in the claim is not material-in a "step plus function
[limitation]; 'step' [is] unnecessary." ' The other example is of a
similar nature and need not be separately discussed, except to note that
in the guidelines the patent office notes that "[iln the event that it is
unclear whether the claim limitation falls within the scope of 112, 6th
paragraph, a rejection under § 112, 2d paragraph may be
appropriate.1' 1
3
107. Application of Roberts, 470 F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
108. Id at 1400; 1162 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OFmcE at 59, Example (5) and n.6.
109. Roberts, 470 F.2d at 1400.
110. Id at 1402.
111. L
112. 1162 OFF. GAz. PAT. Oi-i'cE at 59, Example (5) and n.6. The patent office guidelines
bring this point home by repeatedly referring to the limitation as a "means or step plus function
limitation," in the title and throughout the body of the guidelines.
113. l, Example (6) and n.7, relying on Ex parte Zimmerley, 153 U.S.P.Q. 367 (Pat. &
Trademark Office Bd. App. 1966), in which a claim limitation recited "raising the Ph of the
resultant pulp to about 5.0 to precipitate"; the claim language was rejected by the examiner as
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B. Single Means Claims
A holding of In re.Hyatt,"4 was that a single means claim-i.e.,
a claim that recites only a "means for [performing a specified func-
tion]" as its sole element-does not comply with the enablement re-
quirement of section 112(1). The patent office guidelines provide that
Donaldson does not affect that holding, because "Donaldson applies
only to an interpretation of a limitation drafted to correspond to § 112,
6th paragraph, which by its terms is limited to 'an element in a claim
to a combination,' it does not affect a limitation in a claim which is
not directed to a combination."' " 5
C. Examining Procedure
1. The Search
The guidelines explain that, consistent with the principle repeated
in Donaldson that during prosecution claim language should be given
its broadest reasonable interpretation, examiners will search for a prior
art reference that discloses the identical function specified in the
"means or step plus function" limitation." 6 "[U]nless an element per-
forms the identical function specified in the claim, it cannot be an
equivalent for the purposes of § 112, 6th paragraph."" 7 Thus, the en-
quiry would end for purposes of determining anticipation, since a limi-
tation would not be literally met."'
being indefinite; the Board reversed concluding that the limitation "is properly functional, as this
is a common industrial expedient, and almost always means merely adding any alkali that does
not interfere with the process reactions." Ex parte Zimmerley, 153 U.S.P.Q. at 369.
114. 708 F.2d 712 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
115. 1162 OFF. GAZ. PAT. Omicp at 59.
116. Id
117. L
118. The guidelines do note that even where it is concluded that the prior art element is not
equivalent to the structure, material or acts described in the applicant's specification, the exam-
iner must still make a section 103 analysis to determine if the claimed means or step plus func-
tion is obvious from the prior art to one of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, while a finding of non-
equivalence prevents a prior art element from literally meeting a means or step plus function
limitation in a claim, it does not prevent the prior art element from rendering the claim limitation
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. Also, the guidelines provide the admonition that:
Because the exact scope of an "equivalent" may be uncertain, it would be appro-
priate to apply a §§ 102/103 rejection where the balance of the claim limitations
are anticipated by the prior art relied on. In addition, although it is normally the
best practice to rely on only the best prior art references in rejecting a claim,
alternative grounds of rejection may be appropriate where the prior art shows
elements that are different from each other, and different from the specific struc-
ture, material or acts described in the specification, yet perform the function spec-
ified in the claim.
Id. at 60.
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2. The Examiner's Initial Obligation to Make a Prima
Facie Case of Equivalence-and the Shifting of the
Burden to the Applicant
For each reference located by the examiner that meets the func-
tional recitation exactly, the examiner carries the initial burden of
proof for showing that the prior art structure or step is the same as or
equivalent to the structure, material, or acts described in the specifica-
tion which has been identified as corresponding to the claimed means
or step plus function. " 9 If the specification explicitly defines what is
meant by the limitation for the purposes of the claimed invention, the
examiner should interpret the limitation as having that meaning.1 20 If
the examiner finds that a prior art element performs the exact function
specified in the claim, and is not excluded by any explicit definition
provided in the specification for an equivalent, the examiner should
infer from that finding that the prior art element is an equivalent, and
should then conclude that the claimed limitation is met by the prior art
element. 2 ' "No further analysis of equivalents is required of the ex-
aminer until applicant disagrees with the examiner's conclusion, and
provides reasons why the prior art element should not be considered
an equivalent."' 22
Thus, the burden then shifts to the applicant to show that the
element shown in the prior art is not an equivalent of the structure,
material or acts disclosed in the application.' 23 If the applicant sup-
plies no reasons or inadequate reasons, the limitation is deemed met.
Alternatively, if the disclosure is so broad as to encompass any
and all structure, material or acts for performing the claimed function,
the claims must be read accordingly when determining patentability.
When this happens, the limitation otherwise provided by "equivalents"
ceases to be a limitation on the scope of the claim, in that an
equivalent would be any structure, material or act other than the ones
119. IL at 59.
120. Id The guidelines also recognize that
the "equivalents" limitation as applied to a claim may also operate to constrict the
claim scope to the point of covering virtually only the disclosed embodiments.
This can happen in circumstances where the specification describes the invention
only in the context of a specific structure, material or act that is used to perform
the function specified in the claim.
Id. at 60. It would appear that in such a case, the disclosed structure is treated like the "explic-
itly" defined structure.
121. l at 59-60.
122. Id at 60 n.9.
123. id at 60.
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described in the specification that perform the claimed function.1 24
For example, the guidelines note that "[tihe description of an appara-
tus with block diagrams describing the function, but not the structure,
of the apparatus is not fatal under the enablement requirement of
§ 112, 1st paragraph, as long as the structure is conventional and can
be determined without an undue amount of experimentation."'"
Thus, if the structure corresponding to a "means" element was shown
in the specification in block form, "an equivalent is any element that
performs the specified function."' 26 This would lend itself to a prior
art rejection under sections 102 or 103.127
The guidelines also explain that if the applicant argues that the
claim is limited to specific structural or functional characteristics as
described in the specification (and does not include "equivalents"
thereof) in order to distinguish over the prior art, then the claims must
be amended to recite those characteristics unless the specification
make it plain that the invention is so limited.
1 21
124. Id. In the guidelines, examples are given where: (1) the claimed invention is a combi-
nation of elements, one or more of which are selected from elements that are old per se, or (2)
apparatus claims are treated as indistinguishable from method claims. Id.
125. 1162 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OmcE at 61 n.20, citing In re Ghiron, 442 F.2d 985, 991
(C.C.P.A. 1971).
126. 1162 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OF'IzC at 61. ("[Theory: since there is no corresponding struc-
ture, etc. in the specification to limit the means or step plus function limitation, an equivalent is
any element that performs the specified function]."). On the other hand, if the structure shown in
block form was not conventional and undue experimentation was required to design same, then
the "means or plus function" limitation recited in the claim would not be supported by corre-
sponding structure in the specification disclosure, and a rejection under section 112(1) would be
appropriate. The claim would not be supported by an enabling disclosure because the person
skilled in the art would not know how to make and use the invention without a description of
elements to perform the function. Id. Alternatively, a rejection under section 112(2) might be
appropriate. The claim would be indefinite because the element would not be defined in the
specification by corresponding structure. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
[I]f an applicant argues that the 'means' or 'step' plus function language in a
claim is limited to certain specific structural or additional functional characteris-
tics (as opposed to 'equivalents' thereof) where the specification does not de-
scribe the invention as being only those specific characteristics, the claim should
not be allowed until the claim is amended to recite those specific structural or
additional functional characteristics.
Id. The guidelines also note the obvious:
Finally, as in the past, applicant has the opportunity during proceedings before the
Office to amend the claims so that the claimed invention meets all the statutory
criteria for patentability. An applicant may choose to amend the claim by further
limiting the function so that there is no longer identity of function with that taught
by the prior art element, or the applicant may choose to replace the claimed means
plus function limitation with specific structure material or acts that are not de-
scribed in the prior art.
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3. Determining Whether an Applicant Has Met the
Burden of Proving Non-Equivalence After a Prima
Facie Case is Made
If the applicant disagrees with the inference of equivalence drawn
from a prior art reference, the applicant may provide reasons why the
applicant believes the prior art element should not be considered an
equivalent to the specific structure, material or acts disclosed in the
specification.129 Reasons include teachings in the specification or in
the prior art reference that indicate that the prior art element is not an
equivalent, and Rule 132 affidavit evidence of facts tending to show
non-equivalence. 3' Of course, any evidence proffered as to non-
equivalence that is inconsistent with the disclosure of the specification
is not adequate since the specification is supreme; it is only where the
specification is inconclusive that some judgment is required.' 3' More-
over, "under no circumstance should an examiner accept as persuasive
a bare statement or opinion that the element shown in the prior art is
not an equivalent embraced by the claim limitation."' 32
Where judgment is required-e.g., where the specification is in-
conclusive in that it does not effectively define the scope of
equivalents-it is the general rule that "an 'equivalent' is interpreted
as embracing more than the specific elements described in the specifi-
cation for performing the specified function, but less than any element
that performs the function specified in the claim."' 33 Of course, "[t]he
interpretation will vary depending on how the element is described in
the supporting specification."' 134
The guidelines cite four indicia as "are sufficient to support a
conclusion that one element is or is not an 'equivalent' of a different
element in the context of § 112, 6th paragraph."'135 'These examples
are not intended to be an exhaustive list of the indicia that would sup-
129. Id. at 60.
130. Id.
131. When the applicant relies on teachings in applicant's own specification, the
examiner must make sure that the applicant is interpreting the "means or step plus
function" limitation in the claim in a manner which is consistent with the disclo-
sure in the specification. If the specification defines what is meant by
"equivalents" to the disclosed embodiments for the purpose of the claimed means
or step plus function, the examiner should interpret the limitation as having that
meaning. If no definition is provided, some judgment must be exercised in deter-
mining the scope of "equivalents."
Id.
132. 1,L at 61.
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port a finding that one element is or is not an equivalent of another
element for the purposes of § 112, 6th paragraph." 136  It is said that
"Ithere could be other indicia that also would support the conclu-
sion." 137 However it is also said that "[a] finding according to any of
the above examples would represent a sufficient, but not the only pos-
sible, basis to support a conclusion that an element is or is not an
equivalent." '138 In other words, each indicia or example is in and of
itself sufficient, but not necessary, to establish equivalence. 3 9
While the Federal Circuit has repeatedly admonished in its recent
decisions that the test for determining "equivalents" under section
112(6) is not the same as the test for determining equivalents under
the doctrine of equivalents, 4 ' three of the four indicia are well-settled
indicia for determining the latter.'
4
'
For example, the first of the indicia recited by the patent office is
the Graver Tank 42 three-prong test for determining equivalents under
the doctrine of equivalents which the Federal Circuit chastised the dis-
136. Id. at 61.
137. Id.
138. It
139. But see id.:
[i]n determining whether arguments or Rule 132 evidence presented by an appli-
cant are persuasive that the element shown in the prior art is not an equivalent, the
examiner should consider and weigh as many of the above-indicated or other
indicia as are presented by applicant, and should determine whether, on balance,
the applicant has met the burden of proof to show non-equivalence.
This would appear to indicate that at least where a Rule 132 affidavit is at issue, all the indicia
are weighed and balanced, and no one indicia is controlling.
140. See supra note 21.
141. Nevertheless, the patent office gives lip service to the Federal Circuit admonitions,
stating:
An "equivalent" for the purposes of 112, 6th paragraph, should not be con-
fused with the doctrine of equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents, most often
associated with Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products, 339 U.S. 605, 85
U.S.P.Q. 328 (1950), is sometimes applied to do equity among the parties before
the court in an infringement action involving an issued patent. The doctrine typi-
cally involves a three-part inquiry-whether an accused device performs substan-
tially the same function, in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially the
same result as the claimed invention.
Section 112 6th paragraph limits the scope of the broad language of "means
or step plus function" limitations, in a claim to a combination, to the structures,
materials and acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. The doc-
trine of equivalents equitably expands exclusive patent rights beyond the literal
scope of a claim. Accordingly, decisions involving the doctrine of equivalents
should not unduly influence a determination under § 112, 6th paragraph during
ex parte examination.
1162 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OiFcE at 61.
142. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products, 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
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trict court judge for relying upon in Valmont:143 "1) Whether the prior
art element performs the function specified in the claim in substan-
tially the same way, and produces substantially the same results as the
corresponding element disclosed in the specification."' "
The second of the indicia noted by the patent office is another
indicia for equivalents frequently relied upon by the courts in deter-
mining equivalents under the doctrine of equivalents: "2) Whether a
person of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized the inter-
changeability of the element shown in the prior art for the correspond-
ing element disclosed in the specification." 145
The fourth of the indicia relied upon by the patent office is the
"equitable" factor in determining infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents: "4) Whether the structure, material or acts disclosed in
the specification represents an insubstantial change which adds noth-
ing of significance to the prior art element." 146 This fourth indicia,
however, is nevertheless consistent with the Federal Circuit's decision
in Valmont.147
Only the third of the indicia does not have its origin in an equiva-
lence determination under the doctrine of equivalents:
3) Whether the prior art element is a structural equivalent of the
corresponding element disclosed in the specification being ex-
amined. That is, the prior art element performs the function speci-
fied in the claim in substantially the same manner as the function is
performed by the corresponding element described in the
specification. 148
This last of the indicia is consistent with the decision in Valmont
and Donaldson.
143. Valmont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., 983 F.2d 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1993). See surpa
note 22.
144. 1162 OFF. GAz PAT. OmcICE at 60.
145. Id. See Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1260
(Fed. Cir. 1989) ("An important factor [in determining equivalents under the doctrine of
equivalents] is whether persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the inter-
changeability of an ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was.") (quoting Graver
Tank, 339 U.S. at 609); see also Rite-Hite v. Kelley Co., Inc., 819 F.2d 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
146. 1162 OFF. GAZ. PAT. OmcE at 60-61.
147. Section 112 and the doctrine of equivalents have something in common. The
word "equivalent" in section 112 invokes the familiar concept of an insubstantial
change which adds nothing of significance. In the context of section 112, how-
ever, an equivalent results from an insubstantial change which adds nothing of
significance to the structure, material, or acts disclosed in the patent specification.
A determination of section 112 equivalence does not involve the equitable tripar-
tite test of the doctrine of equivalents.
Valmont, 983 F.2d at 1043.




The patent office has, as expected, determined that it has no alter-
native but to comply with the letter of the law laid down by the Fed-
eral Circuit in Donaldson. Claims will be construed in accordance
with section 112(6). Following the spirit of Donaldson, the patent of-
fice has, on its own, decided to extend the strict statutory construction
approach used by the Federal Circuit in Donaldson, so as to apply
section 112(6) to method claims, something that the Federal Circuit
has heretofore not done. Similarly, attempts to sidestep section 112(6)
by playing with the language to hide the appearance of a "means plus
function" limitation will be shot down. Rather than run from the ap-
plication of section 112(6), the patent office has chosen to embrace the
statute, afford it an expansive role in prosecution, and apply its lan-
guage liberally.
The patent office has also, as expected, promulgated a shifting or
sliding burden of proof system, which it presumably hopes will mini-
mize the work of its examiners. Once the examiner locates prior art
meeting the claimed functional recitation exactly, then the burden will
generally shift to the applicant to prove non-equivalence. The expec-
tation is in part that the applicant will at a minimum leave a paper trail
in the prosecution history that will limit the scope of section 112(6)
equivalents both in the patent office, and later in litigation. If the'ap-
plicant goes to the extreme and presses arguments that indicate that it
is not asserting a range of equivalents or even a very limited range, the
applicant may be required to amend the claims to insert functions or
structures argued to be patentable over the prior art. If the applicant
makes non-equivalence arguments inconsistent with the specification,
they will be summarily rejected. If the applicant argues for too broad
a range of equivalents, the examiner will conclude that any prior art
reference which discloses the function performed is equivalent.
To assist the examiner in evaluating equivalents, the examiner is
authorized to consider at least four indicia or factors, some of which
would appear to be inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's admonition
in Valmont that doctrine of equivalents considerations, such as the tri-
partite test of Graver Tank, are inappropriate to a section 112(6)
analysis.
In short, the patent office guidelines are ushering in new era in
which section 112(6) will play a prominent role. This is a role that
must be fully appreciated by patent attorneys as they draft specifica-
tions, prepare drawings, craft claims, and make arguments during
prosecution.
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